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An Opinion Without Standards: The Supreme Court’s
Refusal to Adopt a Standard of Constitutional Review in
District of Columbia v. Heller Will Likely Cause
Headaches for Future Judicial Review of Gun-Control
Regulations
I. INTRODUCTION
“Guns don’t kill people—people kill people.”1 This is the bumpersticker language of many gun-rights advocates arguing that the American
people should not have their guns snatched away simply because other
people are killed or injured by firearms. After all, guns do not discharge
themselves. The opposing argument, often put forth by those urging the
government to enact stronger gun-control regulations, is seen by many to
be equally valid: though guns do not discharge themselves, guns play a
part—whether accidentally or purposely—in thousands of American
deaths and injuries each year.2 These two competing interests form the
foundation of today’s gun-control debate.
Over the past few decades, with gun control becoming a major
political and social issue, the debate has also focused on whether the
Second Amendment to the Constitution grants each American citizen an
individual right to “keep and bear Arms” or whether the Second
Amendment establishes only a collective right to keep and bear arms in
order to preserve a “well regulated Militia.”3 Federal courts throughout
the country have traditionally held that the Second Amendment should
be interpreted as giving United States citizens only a collective right to
keep and bear arms.4 This collective-right interpretation has arguably
made gun-control regulations easier to pass because under the collectiveright reading, the government can restrict an individual’s right to keep
and bear arms as long as these regulations do not restrict the right to keep
1. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO GUN CONTROL
13 (1992).
2. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2856–57 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
4. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
Miller was considered the seminal Second Amendment case and had traditionally been interpreted
by courts to adopt the collective-right reading before the Supreme Court’s opinion in District of
Columbia v. Heller. Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683,
685 n.6 (2007).

259

260

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 23

and bear arms as related to service in a militia. The pendulum of Second
Amendment interpretation, however, swung sharply in the opposite
direction, in favor of an individual-right theory of the Second
Amendment, during the 2008 Supreme Court term.
The Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller,5 for the first
time in its history, expressly and explicitly adopted the individual-right
theory of the Second Amendment.6 Both Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion and Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion present persuasive and
authoritative textual and historical arguments to support the individualand collective-right theories respectively. Although the majority
convincingly argued for an individual-right reading of the Second
Amendment, the majority omitted from its lengthy opinion the specific
standard of review courts should now use to determine the
constitutionality of current and future gun-control regulations in light of
the newly endorsed individual-right interpretation.7 Not only did the
Court refuse to adopt a specific standard, it may have rejected, either
explicitly or implicitly, all possible standards of constitutional review for
gun-control regulations.8 Therefore, given the Court’s failure to adopt a
specific standard of constitutional review for this newly adopted
individual-right interpretation, federal courts will likely experience
difficulties in applying the Heller opinion to existing and future guncontrol regulations.
Part II of this Note will examine the traditional collective-right
reading of the Second Amendment through a recent Ninth Circuit case,
Silveira v. Lockyer.9 The Silveira opinion endorsed the collective-right
reading and criticizes the Fifth Circuit’s adoption of the individual-right
5. 128 S. Ct. at 2783.
6. Id. at 2797. Although considered monumental in that it officially adopted for the first
time an individual-right theory of the Second Amendment, this ruling by the Supreme Court was not
unexpected. See Saul Cornell, Historical Approach: The Ironic Second Amendment, 1 ALB. GOV’T
L. REV. 292, 294 (2008) (“[T]he ultimate irony may well be that the Supreme Court [in District of
Columbia v. Heller] could easily interpret the Second Amendment as an individual right and still
uphold the District of Columbia’s hand gun ban as a reasonable regulation.”); Winkler, supra note 4,
at 684–86 (discussing that the Fifth Circuit adopted the individual-right theory in United States v.
Emerson and that the individual-right theory became the official position of the Bush
Administration’s Department of Justice in 2002).
7. The standard by which gun-control regulations should be reviewed by courts under the
individual-right theory of the Second Amendment is considered by some scholars to be nearly as
important as the collective right vs. individual right argument itself. See Winkler, supra note 4, at
683–86. As will be discussed in detail below, Justice Breyer in his dissent in District of Columbia v.
Heller criticized the majority for not adopting a specific standard of review and expressed the
importance of an adoption of a standard of review under an individual-right interpretation. 128 S. Ct.
at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“What kind of constitutional standard should the court use? How
high a protective hurdle does the Amendment erect? The question matters.”).
8. See infra discussion and notes accompanying Part IV.D.
9. 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002).
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reading in United States v. Emerson10 (this opinion by the Fifth Circuit
being the first time a federal court of appeals adopted the individual-right
reading of the Second Amendment). Part III will summarize Justice
Scalia and the majority’s most notable arguments for an individual-right
reading in the Heller opinion, along with a brief treatment of both the
dissenting opinions filed by Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer. Finally,
Part IV of this Note will outline four alternative standards of review that
courts might use (and that the Supreme Court could have adopted) in
analyzing gun-control regulation under an individual-right reading of the
Second Amendment: (1) rational-basis scrutiny, (2) strict scrutiny, (3) an
“interest-balancing” standard as suggested by Justice Breyer’s dissent in
Heller, and (4) intermediate scrutiny (arguably being the only standard
not explicitly or implicitly rejected by the majority in Heller). This Note
will endorse and argue for Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach
as the standard that should have been adopted by the majority in Heller.
Part IV will also attempt to determine how courts are to review existing
and future gun-control regulations given that the Court in Heller refused
to adopt a standard and rejected most, if not all of the standards of
constitutional review commonly used.
II. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND
In officially endorsing an individual-right view of the Second
Amendment, the Supreme Court in Heller seemed to settle a long and
drawn-out legal debate that has lasted for decades. However, as one door
of debate and controversy closed, another opened. By failing to adopt a
standard by which gun-control regulations will be reviewed for
constitutionality under the newly endorsed individual-right reading, the
Court opened the door for another debate concerning this historically and
textually ambiguous Second Amendment.
First, it is important to establish the context surrounding the issue
decided by the Heller opinion. On one side (the losing position in Heller)
is the theory that the Second Amendment protects a “collective right” to
keep and bear arms.11 On the other side is the theory adopted by Justice
Scalia in Heller: the “individual-right” theory.12 Each side has strong and
convincing historical evidence to support its respective interpretation of
the Second Amendment. As recently as 2001 and 2002, two federal
appellate courts kept this dichotomy alive. In 2002, the Ninth Circuit in

10. 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
11. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 2799 (Scalia, J., majority).
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Silveira v. Lockyer13 held in favor of a collective-right reading of the
Second Amendment, while in 2001, the Fifth Circuit became the first
federal appellate court to explicitly adopt an individual-right reading of
the Second Amendment in United States v. Emerson.14 Outlined below is
an in-depth look at the Silveira case. The Silveira court directly
addressed several arguments set out in Emerson;15 therefore, along with
its endorsement of the collective-right reading, the treatment of the
Silveira case below will also introduce several of the arguments made for
an individual-right reading by the Fifth Circuit in Emerson. The direct
treatment of Silveira and the indirect treatment of Emerson below will
give important context to the majority’s decision in Heller.
A. The Collective-Right Theory: Silveira v. Lockyer
The Ninth Circuit case Silveira v. Lockyer illustrates the long-held
collective-right reading of the Second Amendment—the reading rejected
by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller.16 In 1999,
California amended its gun-control laws to bolster the state’s restriction
on the “possession, use and transfer” of semi-automatic weapons or
“assault weapons.”17 The plaintiffs in Silveira consisted of California
residents who owned or sought to acquire assault weapons but were
prevented from doing so because of the newly amended gun-control
statute.18 The gun owners challenged the statute, claiming that as
amended, the statute violated their Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms.19 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, endorsing a collective-right
reading of the Second Amendment and holding that the statute did not
violate this collective-right reading.20
1. The Ninth Circuit first outlined the modern Second Amendment debate
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis in Silveira by outlining the
“robust constitutional debate” that was taking place throughout the
country concerning the proper interpretation of the Second

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

312 F.3d at 1056.
270 F.3d at 210.
Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1064–65.
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1056.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1087.
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Amendment.21 The court outlined three principal schools of thought at
the heart of the debate.22 First, the court referred to the view urged by the
National Rifle Association (“NRA”) and other pro-gun advocates as the
“‘traditional individual right’” model.23 Those that espouse this view
argue that individuals have a “fundamental right” to possess and use
guns with only the most limited governmental regulation.24 The second
view, labeled the “‘limited individual right’” model, allows individuals
to possess and use firearms as long as the possession bears a reasonable
relationship to military service.25
The third view, described by the Ninth Circuit as the view “widely
accepted by the federal courts,” is the collective-right interpretation of
the Second Amendment.26 The Ninth Circuit cited two Supreme Court
cases that have long been used to support a collective-right reading of the
Second Amendment.27 In the first of these cases cited by the Silveira
court, Lewis v. United States,28 the Supreme Court cited to its bestknown Second Amendment case to support a collective-right reading of
the Second Amendment—United States v. Miller.29 The Lewis Court
held: “The Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a
firearm that does not have ‘some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.’”30 The Ninth
Circuit did not end its argument in support of a collective-right theory
with these strong precedential Supreme Court cases. Instead, the court
went on to conduct its own independent historical analysis to reinforce
the collective-right reading of the Second Amendment.31

21. Id. at 1060. The court attributed this national interest in the Second Amendment to “gun
violence, the passage of legislation restricting the sale and use of firearms, the cultural significance
of firearms in American society, and the political activities of pro-gun enthusiasts under the
leadership of the National Rifle Association (the NRA).” Id.
22. Id.
23. Only one court had advocated this view of the Second Amendment before the Supreme
Court’s decision in Heller; the Fifth Circuit adopted this view in United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d
203, 219 (5th Cir. 2001).
24. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 219.
25. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1060. This view is nuanced and has also been labeled the
“sophisticated collective-right model” by the Emerson court. 270 F.3d at 219. For a discussion of
this nuanced middle ground of the Second Amendment debate, see Silveira, 312 F.3d at n.8.
26. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1060.
27. Id. at 1061.
28. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
29. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
30. Lewis, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178).
31. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1068–76.
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2. The Ninth Circuit’s historical arguments in support of the collectiveright interpretation.
The Ninth Circuit in Silveira argued for the collective-right reading
of the Second Amendment by examining the historical significance of
both the first (prefatory) and second (operative) clauses of the
amendment.32 The prefatory clause reads, “A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State,” and the operative clause
of the Second Amendment reads, “the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”33 The Silveira court argued that the
“prefatory clause of the Second Amendment sets forth the amendment’s
purpose and intent.”34
a. The prefatory clause: the Silveira court’s interpretation of
“militia.” The most notable argument by the Ninth Circuit concerning
the prefatory clause deals with the meaning of the term “militia” as seen
in Second Amendment. The court argued that the word “militia” refers to
a state military entity. In making this argument, the Ninth Circuit was
countering the Fifth Circuit’s argument in Emerson that the term
“militia,” as used at the time the Second Amendment was ratified,
referred to all citizens.35 The Silveira court argued that the use of the
term “militia” as used in Articles I and II of the Constitution, as well as
the Fifth Amendment, contradicts the Fifth Circuit’s very broad
interpretation of the term militia.36 The Ninth Circuit pointed out that
Article I grants to Congress the power to “provide for calling forth the
Militia to execute Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions.”37 The court stated that “[t]he fact that the militias may be
‘called forth’ by the federal government only in appropriate
circumstances underscores their status as state institutions.”38 Also, the
Commander-in-Chief Clause of Article II provides for the President to
act as the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States.”39 The Fifth Amendment,
which was enacted at the same time as the Second Amendment, grants

32. This approach of analyzing the historical significance of both the prefatory and operative
clauses and their relationship to one another is the same approach taken by the Fifth Circuit in
Emerson and the Supreme Court in Heller—but with obviously different results. See infra Part III.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
34. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1068–69.
35. See Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1069 (quoting United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 235 (5th
Cir. 2001)).
36. Id. at 1070–71.
37. Id. at 1070 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15).
38. Id.
39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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criminal defendants a right to indictment “except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia . . . .”40
According to the Silveira court, these excerpts from Article II and
the Fifth Amendment clearly demonstrate that the Framers saw the
“Militia” as a military body, not as the entire arms-bearing American
population as the Fifth Circuit argued.41 Therefore, in Silveira, the Ninth
Circuit argued that the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment
establishes the purpose of the amendment: to provide for and preserve a
well-regulated (state-run) militia.42
b. The operative clause: the meaning of “keep and bear Arms.” The
Ninth Circuit went on to analyze the operative or second clause of the
Second Amendment.43 The court first found it “highly significant” that
“the second clause does not purport to protect the right to ‘possess’ or
‘own’ arms, but rather to ‘keep and bear’ arms.”44 The court argued that
“[h]istorical research shows that the term ‘bear arms’ generally referred
to the carrying of arms in military service—not the private use of arms
for personal purposes.”45 The court quoted Professor Michael Dorf who,
after “canvassing” founding-era documents, concluded that the phrase to
“keep and bear Arms” had an overwhelmingly military connotation.46
The Ninth Circuit also cited an 1840 Tennessee Supreme Court case that
clearly construed the term “to bear arms” to have a strictly military
connotation.47 The Silveira court made several other historical arguments
relating to the term “bear arms” and then moved on to address the use of
the term “keep” in the prefatory clause.48
The Ninth Circuit focused on the term “keep” because the Emerson
court put forth the argument that the term “keep” did not have a military

40. See Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1070–71 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
41. Id. at 1071.
42. Id. at 1071–72.
43. Id. at 1072.
44. Id.
45. Id. In footnote 28 of its opinion, the Silveira court pointed out that the Emerson court, in
its argument for an individual-right reading, had focused on a few phrases where “bear arms” did not
denote service in the military. The Emerson court focused its argument on the Report of the Minority
of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention of the United States Constitution. 270 F.3d 203, 230–31
(5th Cir. 2001). This Minority Report argued for a private right to bear arms, but the Silveira court
correctly stated that this was indeed the “minority” opinion of the Pennsylvania Convention,
meaning that this private-right-to-bear-arms argument was rejected by the Pennsylvania Convention.
Silveira, 312 F.3d at n.28.
46. Id. at 1072–73 (quoting Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean
Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 291, 314 (2000)).
47. Id. (quoting Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840)) (“‘A man in pursuit of deer, elk and
buffaloes might carry his rifle every day for forty years, and yet it would never be said of him that he
had borne arms.’”).
48. Id. at 1072–74.
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connotation.49 The Silveira court did not find this argument very
convincing given that individuals may “keep” arms for many purposes,
including military use.50 The court argued that the term “keep” has no
meaning without knowing the purpose for which the individual is
“keeping” the arms.51 For this reason, many scholars have construed the
term “keep and bear” together because the term “bear” (which, according
to the Silveira court, had a military connotation at the time of
ratification) gives purpose to the term “keep.”52
c. The Silveira court’s holding. The court concluded from its
examination of both the prefatory and the operative clauses of the
Second Amendment that “the most plausible construction of the Second
Amendment is that it seeks to ensure the existence of effective state
militias in which the people may exercise their right to bear arms.” 53 The
court therefore endorsed the collective-right reading of the Second
Amendment and rejected the Emerson court’s individual-right
interpretation. After adopting a collective-right reading, the court
accordingly refused to strike down California’s ban on assault weapons,
much to the dismay of gun-rights advocates such as the NRA. However,
only six years later, the NRA and gun advocates throughout the country
would receive their much-desired outcome in the Supreme Court of the
United States.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S OPINION: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER
In the recent landmark decision of District of Columbia v. Heller,54
the Supreme Court, for the first time in its history, interpreted the Second
Amendment as granting an individual right to each American citizen to
keep and bear arms.55 The District of Columbia’s gun-control regulations
at issue in Heller essentially banned the possession of all handguns in the
District and required those who kept other firearms at home to either
disassemble their guns or render them unusable by employing a trigger49. See id. at 1074.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. Construing the term “keep and bear” together is tersely rejected by Justice Scalia in
his majority opinion in Heller. See infra Part.III.A.1.b. Both sides offer very convincing arguments
as to the meaning of and correct reading of the term “keep and bear Arms.” These dueling historical
arguments, although interesting, are never-ending. The fact that the individual-right theory wins the
day in Heller appears to be the result of a majority of Justices espousing one of the two arguments—
not because of the historical strength of the individual-right reading and the historical weakness of
the collective-right reading.
53. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1075.
54. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
55. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797.
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locking mechanism.56 Mr. Dick Heller challenged the constitutionality of
the D.C. handgun regulations.57 Mr. Heller was allowed to carry a
handgun while he worked as a special police officer at the Federal
Judicial Center, but under the anti-handgun regulation, Mr. Heller was
not allowed to register a handgun that he wished to keep at his home. 58
Mr. Heller argued that this ban on handguns and the regulation’s
requirement to render all other firearms kept in the home unusable were
violations of his right to have access to a weapon for self-defense in the
home.59 The U.S. District Court dismissed Mr. Heller’s challenge of the
D.C. gun-control regulations,60 but the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding the regulations unconstitutional.61
With this decision, the D.C. Circuit became the second federal
appellate court (the Fifth Circuit in Emerson being the first) to hold that
the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear
arms.62 The court held that “the city’s total ban on handguns, as well as
its requirement that firearms in the home be kept nonfunctional even
when necessary for self-defense” violated Mr. Heller’s individual right to
keep and bear arms.63 As discussed above, the Supreme Court fully
affirmed the D.C. Circuit’s holding the following year.64 The Ninth
Circuit in Silveira outlined the strongest arguments in support of a
collective-right reading of the Second Amendment.65 Outlined below are
the strongest arguments in support of an individual-right reading of the
Second Amendment as espoused by Justice Scalia and the majority in
Heller.
A. The Supreme Court Discusses the “Meaning”of the Second
Amendment
In his majority opinion in Heller, Justice Scalia devoted twentyseven pages of his thirty-five-page opinion to argue that the Second
Amendment’s proper meaning grants each individual citizen a right to

56. See D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01(12); 7-2502.01(a); 7-2502.02(a)(4); 7.2507.02 (2001)
(providing that individuals could possess handguns with a one-year license from the District;
however, the District gave licenses only in a very narrow set of circumstances).
57. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2004).
61. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
62. Id.
63. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788.
64. Id. at 2822.
65. See supra Part II.A.2.
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keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense.66 This “Meaning of
the Second Amendment” section focuses primarily on the historical and
textual arguments in favor of an individual-right reading of the Second
Amendment. Justice Scalia also, to a lesser degree, discussed whether an
individual-right reading conflicts with any Supreme Court precedent
cases67 and whether the right to keep and bear arms exists through
natural law, separate from any enumeration of this right.68
1. Justice Scalia’s historical and textual support for an individual-right
reading
Like the Fifth Circuit in Emerson,69 Justice Scalia analyzed the
historical and textual meanings of the prefatory and operative clauses of
the Second Amendment to argue for an individual-right reading.70 Justice
Scalia first disputed the argument made in Silveira and by Justice
Stevens in his dissent that the prefatory clause limits the operative
clause.71 Justice Scalia refuted this argument by quoting a nineteenthcentury commentary on written laws, which states: “‘It is nothing
unusual in acts . . . for the enacting part to go beyond the preamble; the
remedy often extends beyond the particular act or mischief which first
suggested the necessity of the law.’”72 This is an important piece of the
majority’s argument for an individual-right reading of the Second
Amendment because the collective-right advocates argue that the
prefatory clause gives meaning or purpose to the operative clause and
thereby limits its meaning.73 Instead of beginning with an analysis of the
prefatory clause, however, Justice Scalia began by analyzing the
operative clause.74

66. Id. at 2789–2816.
67. Id. at 2812–15.
68. Id. at 2801.
69. See supra Part II.A.2.
70. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789. Justice Scalia also refers to the prefatory clause as the
“preamblee” and the operative clause as the “enacting part.”
71. Id. at 2789.
72. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789 (quoting J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON WRITTEN LAWS AND
THEIR INTERPRETATION §51, at 49 (1882)).
73. See Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2002).
74. Justice Scalia began with the operative clause because he claims that the prefatory clause
can only be used to “clarify an ambiguous operative provision” and that, therefore, “surely the first
step must be to determine whether the operative clause provision is ambiguous.” Heller, 128 S. Ct. at
2790 n.4. This approach of analyzing the operative clause before the prefatory clause is criticized by
Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion. See id. at 2826 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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a. The majority’s analysis of the term “Right of the People” in the
operative clause. Justice Scalia and the majority began their analysis of
the operative clause of the Second Amendment by examining the term
“Right of the People.”75 The Court points out that this term is used two
other times in the Bill of Rights: in the First Amendment’s Assemblyand-Petition Clause and in the Fourth Amendment’s Search-and-Seizure
Clause.76 According to the Court, the term “Right of the People” in the
First and Fourth Amendments “unambiguously refer[s] to individual
rights, not ‘collective’ rights, or rights that may be exercised only
through participation in some corporate body.”77 Given that the use of
“Right of the People” elsewhere in the Bill of Rights denotes individual
rights, the Court sees this as an implication that the use of “Right of the
People” in the Second Amendment should also have an individual-right
connotation.78 Justice Scalia also examined when the term “the people” is
used elsewhere in the Constitution.79 According to the majority, the six
other times “the people” appears in the Constitution, the term
“unambiguously refers to all member of the political community, not an
unspecified subset.”80
b. The majority’s analysis of “keep and bear Arms” in the operative
clause. Justice Scalia and the majority next addressed the phrase “keep
and bear Arms” as seen in the operative clause of the Second
Amendment.81 The Court argued that the term “arms” applied to
weapons that were not specifically designed for military use.82 The Court
cited Cunningham’s legal dictionary as saying: “‘Servants and labourers
shall use bows and arrows on Sundays & c. and not bear other arms.’”83
Justice Scalia explained that the term “‘bear’” in the eighteenth century
meant “‘carry.’”84 Justice Scalia wisely cited to Justice Ginsburg’s

75. Id. at 2790.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2790–91.
80. Id. (citing TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, 1 A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (1771)).
Justice Scalia cited here to United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, which states, “‘The people’ seems to
have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution . . . [that] refers to a class of
persons who are part of a national community.” 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
81. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791.
82. Id.
83. Id. This use of the word “arms” clearly does not limit its use to military situations, since
it is used in the context of service or labor. But see J. TRUSLER, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WORDS
ESTEEMED SYNONYMOUS IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 37 (1794) (“[T]his eighteenth-century
thesaurus limited “arms” to have the meaning of “instruments of offence generally made use of in
war.”).
84. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2793 (citing T. SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1796)).
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opinion in Muscarello v. United States,85 in which she reasoned that the
term “carry a firearm” had the meaning “as the Constitution’s Second
Amendment . . . indicate[s]: ‘wear, bear , or carry . . . for the purpose . . .
of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of
conflict with another person.’”86 Justice Scalia agreed with Justice
Ginsburg’s definition of “bear arms” and pointed out that Justice
Ginsburg’s definition “in no way connotes participation in a structured
military organization.”87 The majority concluded that this definition of
“bear arms” enunciated by Justice Ginsburg was the “natural meaning”
of “bear arms” in the eighteenth century.88
The Court went on to buttress its position by arguing that the most
notable evidence of the eighteenth-century meaning of “bear arms” is
found in nine state constitutions drafted in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries.89 These state constitutions grant each citizen the
right to “‘bear arms in defense of himself and the state.’”90 The Court
argued that this formulation of “bear arms” in the state constitutions did
not exclusively refer to bearing arms in a military capacity; on the
contrary, this formulation explicitly reserved to each citizen an individual
right to bear arms for the purpose of his self-defense.91
The majority also addressed a study discussed by Justice Stevens in
his dissent, which concluded that the term “bear arms” was most
frequently used in a military context at the time of the ratification.92
Justice Scalia rejected this argument by reasoning that the fact that the
term “bear arms” was frequently used in one context does not necessarily
limit its use to that frequently used context.93 Justice Scalia also
addressed Justice Stevens’s argument (also made by the Ninth Circuit in
Silveira94) that “‘keep and bear Arms’” is a unitary phrase—or, in other
words, that the term “bear” gives meaning to the term “keep.”95 Justice

85. Id. (citing Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998)).
86. Id. (quoting Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
87. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2793. This is well argued by Justice Scalia, given that he uses Justice
Ginsburg’s definition of “bear arms”—Justice Ginsburg being one of the four dissenting Justices in
the Heller case. Id. at 2787.
88. Id. at 2793.
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XIII; VT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XV;
KY. CONST. art. XII, cl. 23 (1792); OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 20 (1802); IND. CONST. art. I, § 20
(1816); MISS. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1817); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1818); ALA. CONST. art. I § 23
(1819); MO. CONST. art. XIII, § 3 (1820)).
91. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2793.
92. Id. at 2795; see id. at 2828–29 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 2795.
94. See supra Part II.A.2.
95. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797.
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Scalia disagreed that “‘keep and bear Arms’” is a unitary phrase, but he
stated that even assuming the phrase was unitary, there is no evidence
that this phrase has a military meaning.96 Instead, Justice Scalia cited to
historical instances where “keep and bear Arms” has a nonmilitary
meaning.97 The majority concluded its analysis of the operative clause by
stating: “Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they
guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of
confrontation.”98
c. The majority’s analysis of “well regulated Militia” in the
prefatory clause. After its extensive analysis of the operative clause, the
majority next briefly turned to the prefatory clause in order to criticize
the petitioners’ and the dissenting Justices’ “narrow” view of the
definition of the term “Militia” as found in the Second Amendment.99
The petitioners (the District of Columbia) argued that “militias” during
the time period of ratification were state or congressionally regulated
military forces.100 Justice Scalia, however, explained that “‘the Militia
comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the
common defense.’”101 Justice Scalia argued that militias were groups of
citizens able to fight, not existing, organized bodies ready to fight.102
This point is important to the majority because if militia denoted all ablebodied male citizens, all able male citizens would have the right to keep
and bear arms—whether a militia was organized or not. Justice Scalia’s
definition of “militia” undercuts one of the main arguments used by
those who endorse a collective-right reading of the Second
Amendment.103 The majority only briefly examined the term “‘well

96. Id. This claim that there is no evidence that the unitary phrase “keep and bear Arms” has
a military meaning is directly rebutted by the Ninth Circuit in Silveira v. Lockyer. See supra Part
II.A.2. The Ninth Circuit argued that “bear” has a military meaning and that when “bear” is read
with “keep,” the unitary phrase has a military meaning. Id. This argument between individual-right
advocates and collective-right advocates is a perfect example of the directly conflicting, yet equally
reputable, historical evidence that each side uses to support its respective position in the debate. This
argument also suggests that perhaps the individual-right reading won out not because it is the correct
argument (it may be impossible to tell which one is correct), but because the majority simply chose
to accept one group of valid historical arguments over another group of valid historical arguments.
97. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797 (“In a 1780 debate in the House of Lords, for example, Lord
Richmond described an order to disarm private citizens (not militia members) as a ‘violation of the
constitutional right of Protestant subjects to keep and bear arms for their own defense.’” 49 THE
LONDON MAGAZINE OR GENTLEMEN’S MONTHLY INTELLIGENCER 467 (1780)).
98. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797.
99. Id. at 2799.
100. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioners, at 12).
101. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
102. Id.
103. See Part II.A.2.a.
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regulated’” in the prefatory clause as meaning “the imposition of proper
discipline and training.”104
One reason for the majority’s relatively brief treatment of the
prefatory clause is, according to Justice Scalia, the prefatory clause does
not limit the operative clause.105 Therefore, since the “right of the people
to keep and bear Arms” language in the operative clause is most
important to the majority, Justice Scalia focused on this right-granting
language. Justice Scalia went on to ask: “Does the preface [prefatory
clause] fit with an operative clause that creates an individual right to
keep and bear arms?”106 He answered his own question by saying: “It fits
perfectly, once one knows the history that the founding generation knew
and that we have described above.”107
d. The majority’s alternative, natural-right argument for the Second
Amendment. An element of the majority’s opinion worth exploring here
is Justice Scalia’s acknowledgment that it is “entirely sensible that the
Second Amendment’s prefatory clause announces the purpose for which
the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the militia.”108 However,
as discussed above, according to Justice Scalia, the prefatory clause does
not suggest that the right to bear arms should be limited to the militia—
Justice Scalia claimed that Americans expected and today expect more
from the Second Amendment.109
One might argue that even though protecting the militia is not the
only expectation Americans have of the Second Amendment—the text of
the Amendment itself does not suggest that it meant more. Justice Scalia
appeared to address this problem by arguing that the right to bear arms
was and is “ancient” or natural.110 Justice Scalia argued that the Framers,
through the Second Amendment, codified a right that already existed.
The Second Amendment declared or formalized this ancient right, but
the right existed before the ratification of this Amendment and,
according to Justice Scalia, the individual right to keep and bear arms
continued to exist after the ratification—regardless of what was meant by

104. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2800 (citing SAMUEL JOHNSON, 1 DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1619 (4th ed. 1773)).
105. Id. at 2789.
106. Id. at 2801.
107. Id. With the phrase, “[i]t fits perfectly,” Justice Scalia may be overplaying his hand. The
majority makes a strong argument for an individual-right reading of the Second Amendment, but
saying that “[i]t fits perfectly” is probably the strongest statement Justice Scalia could make,
especially considering that these two clauses have been debated for decades. If it is so clear that the
two clauses fit perfectly under an individual-right reading, why the years and years of debate?
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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the Second Amendment.111 Justice Scalia did not rely on this “natural
right to bear arms” idea as the crux of his argument, but if he did, this
argument would be rather convincing. With this natural-right argument,
Justice Scalia could essentially concede to the dissenters all of their
historical and textual arguments surrounding the Second Amendment and
still come out victorious—the natural right to keep and bear arms would
exist independent of any text.
e. The interpretation of the Second Amendment immediately after its
ratification. To solidify its argument that the Second Amendment
granted an individual right to keep and bear arms, the majority examines
post-ratification commentary on the meaning of the Second
Amendment.112 According to Justice Scalia, three “important foundingera legal scholars” interpreted the Second Amendment as protecting an
individual right “unconnected with military service.”113 First, Justice
Scalia cited to what is arguably the most well-known and notable legal
commentary: Blackstone.114 According to Justice Scalia, “St. George
Tucker’s version of Blackstone’s Commentaries . . . conceived of the
Blackstonian arms right as necessary for self-defense.”115 The majority
also quotes Tucker as saying: “The right to self-defense is the first law of
nature. . . .”116
Second, Justice Scalia discussed the Second Amendment views of
William Rawle, who was a prominent lawyer and a member of the
Pennsylvania Ratification Assembly.117 In 1825, while writing
concerning the meaning of the Second Amendment, Rawle stated: “No
clause in the constitution could by any rule of construction be conceived
to give to congress a power to disarm the people.”118 Third, the majority
cited to Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the United

111. Id. This brief foray by Justice Scalia into the natural or declaratory world appears to be an
argument in the alternative from his long, drawn-out historical and textual arguments discussed
above. If Justice Scalia’s historical arguments are valid, he does not need this natural-right argument
(it should be noted that Justice Scalia does not use the term “natural right,” but he certainly implies
that this “ancient” right existed before the ratification of the Second Amendment and that the
Amendment merely codified this right). A natural-right argument does, however, have some teeth. If
the Second Amendment only declared or formalized a natural, fundamental right, (the right to keep
and bear arms), then the proper meaning or context of the Second Amendment would not make any
difference because under a natural-right theory, the right to keep and bear arms exists independent of
the Second Amendment—whether individual, collective or otherwise.
112. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2805.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting 1 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, at App. 300).
117. Id. at 2805–06.
118. Id. (quoting RAWLE 121–22).
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States, which was published in 1833.119 Justice Scalia likely addressed
Story’s commentaries because Justice Stevens’s dissent claimed that
“[t]here is not so much as a whisper”120 in Story’s commentaries that
favors an individual-right reading of the Second Amendment.121 Justice
Scalia stated that Justice Stevens “is wrong” about Story’s
commentaries.122 Justice Scalia argued that Story cited to both Tucker
and Rawle for his analysis of the Second Amendment—both of whom
explicitly adopted an individual right to bear arms.123 The majority also
cited to an 1840 work by Story in which he wrote that one way in which
tyrants “‘accomplish their purposes without resistance, is, by disarming
the people, and making it an offence to keep arms.’”124 This postratification commentary strongly supports Justice Scalia’s argument for
an individual-right reading of the Second Amendment.
2. Justice Scalia addresses whether Supreme Court precedent allows an
individual-right reading
Justice Scalia and the majority relatively briefly addressed whether
an individual-right reading of the Second Amendment is at odds with
past Supreme Court precedent.125 Justice Scalia addressed the Supreme
Court case most relied upon by the collective-right-reading advocates—
United States v. Miller.126 The majority was forced to address Supreme
Court precedent because Justice Stevens in his dissent stated,
Even if the textual and historical arguments on both sides of the
issue were evenly balanced, respect for the well-settled views of all of
our predecessors on this Court, and for the rule of law itself . . . would
prevent most jurists from endorsing such a dramatic upheaval in the
127
law.

119. Id. at 2806.
120. Id. at 2840 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 2806 (Scalia, J., majority).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2807 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 450 (reprinted in 1986) (1840)). This quote from Story’s 1840 work may also
be used to argue that he was not speaking of the people as individuals, but collectively in the context
of the militia. The quote is too ambiguous to know if Story was discussing the individual rights of
the people to keep arms for self-defense or if Story was discussing the right of the people generally
to defend themselves from tyrants as a people—as through militias.
125. Id. at 2812.
126. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
127. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2824 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia asked, “And what is, according to Justice Stevens, the
holding of Miller that demands such obeisance?”128 Justice Scalia
promptly rejected any argument that Miller adopted a collective, militiarelated right to bear arms.129 However, the evidence Justice Scalia used
to support his argument that the Miller case does not adopt a collectiveright theory is unclear and rather weak. Justice Scalia cited the following
language from Miller,
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or
use of a [short-barreled shotgun] at this time has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,
we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep
130
and bear such an instrument.

Justice Scalia went on to say that this language from the Miller case “is
not only consistent with, but positively suggests that, the Second
Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms.”131 It is
unclear how Justice Scalia can make this claim. Also, Justice Scalia
stated that if the Court had believed that the Second Amendment
protected only those serving in the militia; it would have been odd to
examine the character of the weapon rather than note that the two men
were not militiamen.132 However, in the language cited above, the Miller
Court is using the prefatory clause as a limit on the operative “right to
bear Arms” clause: an idea staunchly rejected by the majority earlier in
Justice Scalia’s opinion.133 In the majority’s rather strong endorsement
for the individual-right reading of the Second Amendment, this
discussion of the Miller holding may be the weakest part of the opinion.
Therefore, through historical, textual, natural law, and doctrinal
arguments, Justice Scalia and the majority endorsed the individual-right
reading of the Second Amendment for the first time in Supreme Court
history.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 2814 (Scalia, J., majority).
Id.
Id. (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 2814.
See discussion supra Part III.A.1.c.
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B. Justice Stevens’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens’s dissent is very similar to the Ninth Circuit’s
arguments set forth in the Silveira case outlined above.134 The Stevens
dissent cited to historical, textual, and doctrinal arguments to support a
collective-right reading of the Second Amendment.135 Most notably,
Justice Stevens argued that the militia-related prefatory clause limits the
right-bearing operative clause and that the intent of the Framers was not
to grant an individual right to bear arms, but to grant a collective,
military-related right to bear arms.136 Justice Stevens also cited to the
Supreme Court precedent case of United States v. Miller to argue for a
collective-right reading of the Second Amendment.137 These main
arguments in Justice Stevens’s dissent have been extensively examined
above in this Note’s treatment of both the Silveira case and the
majority’s opinion above. Since these arguments have already been
treated above, they will not be repeated here.
C. Justice Breyer’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Breyer joined with Justice Stevens’s dissent in the Heller
opinion but added his own, independent dissenting opinion to further
counter the majority’s historical and textual arguments. Justice Breyer
also added some important discussion regarding deference to legislative
findings relating to gun death and injury statistics.138 Finally, Justice
Breyer’s dissent exposed the majority’s failure to adopt a standard for
courts to review existing and future gun-control regulations under this
newly accepted individual-right reading of the Second Amendment.139
Since the historical and textual arguments countering the individual-right
reading were extensively treated above in the Silveira opinion,140 and
since the standard-of-review discussion will be treated extensively
below, this section will examine Justice Breyer’s argument for deference
to gun-related death and injury statistics to support his arguments against
the majority.
As has been outlined above, the two competing interests in the guncontrol debate are (1) the government’s interest in the public safety of its

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See discussion supra Part II.A.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822–47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2827–33.
Id. at 2845–46.
Id. at 2854–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2851–53.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
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citizens, and (2) the protection of each citizen’s enumerated rights.141 In
striking down the D.C. gun-control regulations, the majority generally
chose to “protect” each citizen’s enumerated right to keep and bear arms
over the government’s public safety interest. In his dissent, Justice
Breyer used legislative findings and statistics to argue that the Court
should have deferred to the D.C. legislature and aligned itself with the
government’s (in this case, the District of Columbia’s) “compelling”
interest in public safety.142
Justice Breyer first asked the reader to “consider the facts as the
legislature saw them when it adopted the District [gun-control] statute”
in 1976.143 The goal of the statute, according to the local council
committee, was “to reduce the potentiality for gun-related crimes and
gun-related deaths from occurring within the District of Columbia.” 144
The committee conducted “extensive public hearings and lengthy
research” to come to its conclusion that “the easy availability of
firearms” has greatly contributed to the increase “in gun-related violence
and crime over the past 40 years.”145 The Council consulted various mid1970 gun-control statistics, for example, that guns were at least in part
responsible for 69 deaths in the United States every day, 25,000 such
deaths each year.146 The Council also had information that in the 1970s,
guns were responsible for 200,000 serious injuries in the United States.147
In the District of Columbia itself, 285 murders were perpetrated by guns
in 1974—”a record number.”148 The Council also had information that
twenty-five percent of murders occurred among families and that
“firearms are more frequently involved in deaths and violence among
relatives and friends than in premeditated activities.”149 In passing the
gun-control regulations at issue in Heller, the Council especially focused
on the control of handguns because “the committee report found them to
have a particularly strong link to undesirable activities in the District’s
exclusively urban environment.”150 Therefore, according to Justice
Breyer, the District of Columbia City Council had ample justification in
passing such a gun-control regulation in the 1970s.

141. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 2854–57, 2861.
143. Id. at 2854.
144. Id. (quoting Hearing and Disposition before the House Committee on the District of
Columbia on H. Con. Res. 694, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 25 (1976)).
145. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 2855.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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Justice Breyer next suggested that the reader also “consider the facts
as a court must consider them looking at the matter as of today.”151 In
other words, does the statute still have statistical support today?
According to Justice Breyer, the answer is a resounding “yes.” 152 Justice
Breyer cited various statistics that show only an increase in the severity
of gun-related violence in both the United States and the District of
Columbia since the statute was passed by the District of Columbia in
1976.153 However, Justice Breyer also outlined statistics presented by
those individuals seeking to overturn the D.C. regulations: statistics
intended to demonstrate that the D.C. regulations have not made a
difference in the violence.154 Justice Breyer did not attempt to make
sense out of the dueling statistics presented, but he convincingly
concluded that the District had very important reasons for enacting the
gun-control regulations and that the Court should defer to those strong
justifications: “For these reasons, I conclude that the District’s statute
properly seeks to further the sort of life-preserving and public-safety
interests that the Court has called ‘compelling.’”155
IV. WHAT IS THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER AN
INDIVIDUAL-RIGHT READING?
The preceding twenty-plus pages of this Note have been largely
dedicated to the dueling historical, textual, and doctrinal arguments put
forth by both sides (both collectivists and individualists) of the Second
Amendment debate. Now that the Supreme Court has apparently laid this
debate to rest, how should courts scrutinize existing and future guncontrol regulations for constitutionality under the newly adopted
individual-right reading of the Second Amendment? Unfortunately, the
majority in Heller refused to answer this question and failed to adopt a
specific standard of constitutional scrutiny.156 However, as stated by
Justice Breyer in his dissent, “The question matters.”157 All the historical,
151. Id. (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)).
152. Id. at 2859.
153. See id. at 2856–57.
154. See id. at 2857–60.
155. Id. at 2861 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987)).
156. See id. at 2850–51. The majority rejected the rational-basis standard explicitly and the
strict scrutiny standard implicitly (both of these standards and the majority’s reaction to them will be
explored below), but Justice Scalia and the majority were silent as to an appropriate standard of
review. See id. at 2816–17 (Scalia, J., majority).
157. Id. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The majority merely states that the District of
Columbia’s gun law is unconstitutional under “any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied
to enumerated constitutional rights.” Id. at 2817–18 (Scalia, J., majority). The majority does respond
to Justice Breyer’s “interest-balancing” approach with criticism (which will be examined in greater
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textual, and doctrinal support for the individual-right reading of the
Second Amendment is for naught if courts are given very little direction
on how to review gun-control regulations under this newly endorsed
interpretation. Yet, as decided, Heller provided very little direction for
future review of gun-control regulations. Justice Breyer’s dissent rightly
called the majority out on this issue.158 Justice Breyer reviewed three
potential standards that the majority could have adopted: (1) the rationalbasis-scrutiny standard, (2) the strict-scrutiny standard, and (3) an
“interest balancing” standard (this is the standard outlined and adopted
by Justice Breyer).159 Each of these standards was analyzed and critiqued
below with Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing standard of review being
the standard the majority should have adopted in the Heller case. The
only standard not rejected by the Court in Heller, the intermediate
standard, is also briefly examined.
A. Evaluating Gun-Control Regulations under the Rational-Basis
Standard
The rational-basis standard “requires a court to uphold regulation[s]
so long as [they] bear a ‘rational relationship’ to a ‘legitimate
governmental purpose.’”160 Under rational-basis scrutiny, “A statute is
presumed constitutional.”161 That is, courts are extremely deferential to
legislatures, requiring “the one attacking the legislative arrangement to
negative every conceivable basis which might support it.”162 Under this
deferential rational-basis standard, “[A] legislative choice . . . may be
based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical
data.”163 When courts review laws under this very deferential standard,
“almost all laws”164 will be upheld.
The majority in Heller stated that the District of Columbia’s gun
regulations at issue in the case were unconstitutional under any of the
standards of scrutiny previously used by the Court to examine
detail below), but the Court still refuses to adopt a standard of review, saying, “[S]ince this case
represents this Court’s first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect
it to clarify the entire field.” Id. at 2821. Adopting a standard of review to enable courts to correctly
evaluate gun-control regulations would hardly require the Court to clarify “the entire field,” yet the
majority mysteriously refuses to venture down the road of constitutional standards of review.
158. See id. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159. See id. at 2850–53.
160. Id. at 2851 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
161. Doe, 509 U.S. at 320.
162. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
163. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
164. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.27 (Scalia, J., majority).
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enumerated constitutional rights.165 However, as Justice Breyer pointed
out in his dissent, the D.C. regulations would almost certainly survive
rational-basis-scrutiny review.166 In response to Justice Breyer’s
criticism, the majority stated that rational-basis scrutiny is predominantly
used when the courts are evaluating laws that themselves prohibit
“irrational” laws.167 Therefore, according to the majority, rational-basis
scrutiny should “not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature
may regulate a specific, enumerated right . . . [such as] the right to keep
and bear arms.”168 Whether rational-basis scrutiny could apply or not, if
this deferential standard were used to evaluate the D.C. gun-control laws
at issue in this case, these regulations would likely be upheld because
there would only need to be a showing of some rational basis for the
laws. One clearly rational basis or legitimate governmental purpose for
enacting the D.C. gun regulations was to prevent gun-related accidents.
Additionally, under rational-basis scrutiny, the District would not even
need to present empirical data as a foundation for this legitimate
governmental purpose (which the legislature nevertheless did).169 In
anticipation of the Heller case, several scholars thought the Court could,
and even should, adopt this rational-basis-scrutiny standard in evaluating
gun-control regulations.170
Evaluating gun-control regulations under a rational-basis-scrutiny
standard is likely too deferential to legislatures, especially given the
Court’s finding that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual
right to keep and bear arms.171 If essentially every gun-control regulation
is upheld because the regulations are being evaluated under a rationalbasis-scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court’s individual-right holding
would be gutted; no gun-control regulation would be found to violate the

165. Id. at 2817–18.
166. Id. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The majority is wrong when it says that the District’s
law is unconstitutional ‘[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated
constitutional rights.’ How could that be? It certainly would not be unconstitutional under, for
example, a ‘rational basis’ standard . . . .”).
167. Id. at 2817 n.27 (Scalia, J., majority).
168. Id. (“If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational
basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on
irrational laws, and would have no effect.”).
169. Id.
170. See Saul Cornell, Historical Approach: The Ironic Second Amendment, 1 ALB. GOV’T L.
REV. 292, 294 (2008) (“[T]he ultimate irony may well be that the Supreme Court [in District of
Columbia v. Heller] could easily interpret the Second Amendment as an individual right and still
uphold the District of Columbia’s hand gun ban as a reasonable regulation.”); Winkler, supra note 4,
at 686.
171. But see Winkler, supra note 4, at 686. Professor Winkler argues that “the Second
Amendment’s individual right to bear arms is appropriately governed by deferential, reasonableness
review under which nearly all gun control laws would survive judicial scrutiny.” Id.
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individual right of citizens to keep and bear arms because every
legislature could demonstrate a rational basis for the regulation. Whether
one agrees with the Court’s individual-right reading or not, if lower
courts are to follow the holding in Heller, this entirely deferential
standard would not allow courts to apply an individual-right reading to
any gun-control regulations and would essentially invalidate the Heller
Court’s holding. Therefore, the rational-basis-scrutiny standard should
not, and likely will not, be used by lower courts to evaluate gun-control
regulations under the newly adopted individual-right reading of the
Second Amendment.172
B. Evaluating Gun-Control Regulations under a Strict-Scrutiny
Standard
The strict-scrutiny standard is essentially the opposite of the rationalbasis standard. That is, under the strict-scrutiny standard, instead of
greatly deferring to legislatures, courts examine each law very closely
“to determine whether it is ‘narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest.’”173 Strict scrutiny is most commonly used when
dealing with race-based legislation or classification.174 The Supreme
Court has held, “all racial classifications [imposed by government] . . .
must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”175 Courts
impose strict-scrutiny review in race-based situations because racial
classifications “raise special fears that they are motivated by an invidious
purpose.”176 Strict scrutiny is also employed by courts when statutes
“interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right, such as freedom of
speech”177 or the free exercise of religion.178 Strict scrutiny requires
courts to perform a “searching judicial inquiry”179 into the impetus
behind, and reasons for, the enactment of the law in question.
Strict scrutiny is, along with rational-basis scrutiny, an inappropriate
standard by which gun-control regulations should be evaluated.180 Unlike
the rational-basis standard where essentially all gun-control regulations

172. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.27.
173. Id. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997)).
174. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–06 (2005).
175. Id. at 505 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(alteration in original)).
176. Id. at 505.
177. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983).
178. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
179. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
180. See Winkler, supra note 4, at 686. But see Roy Lucas, From Patsone & Miller to Silveira
v. Lockyer: To Keep and Bear Arms, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 257, 329 (2004).
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would be upheld, under a strict-scrutiny standard, essentially all guncontrol regulations would be overturned or struck down. Under strict
scrutiny, even gun-control laws explicitly accepted by the majority in
Heller, such as laws governing concealed weapons, laws governing the
sale of firearms, and laws restricting weapons in certain locations (like
schools) could become constitutionally jeopardized.181 Professor Adam
Winkler states that gun laws should not be reviewed under a strictscrutiny standard because “gun laws are generally motivated by
legitimate public safety concerns rather than invidious purposes.”182
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, rejected the strict-scrutiny standard for
reviewing gun-control regulations and claimed that the majority
implicitly did the same.183 Justice Breyer cites to a law review article that
summarizes hundreds of gun-control decisions by the Supreme Courts of
42 states; these courts have expansively adopted a standard that is more
deferential to legislatures than strict scrutiny.184 Justice Breyer claimed
the majority implicitly rejected the strict-scrutiny standard “by broadly
approving a set of laws”; the section of the majority opinion Justice
Breyer is referring to reads in part as follows:
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited. . . . [N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
185
sensitive places such as schools or government buildings . . . .

The majority labels these laws that limit the right to keep and bears arms
as “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.”186 In other words, since
these laws limiting the right to bear arms are “presumptively lawful,”
courts are not allowed to impose the higher strict-scrutiny standard to
these regulations; under a strict-scrutiny standard, instead of courts
presuming constitutionally, these laws would be considered
presumptively unlawful. However, as described above,187 the strictscrutiny standard may apply to laws limiting the exercise of fundamental

181. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817; see also id. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182. Winkler, supra note 4, at 727.
183. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
184. See id. at 2852 (citing Winkler, supra note 4, at 687, 716–18). Justice Breyer recognizes
that these state cases “obviously are not controlling” but explains that these cases are instructive. Id.
(citing Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 134 (1959)); see also David B. Kopel, What State
Constitutions Teach About the Second Amendment, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 827, 827–29 (2002).
185. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
186. Id. at 2817 n.26.
187. See supra text accompanying note 177.
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rights. Is the newly declared individual right to keep and bear arms
“fundamental”? Although the majority in Heller did not specifically label
the individual right to keep and bear arms as fundamental, the majority
likely considers the right as such.188 It appears therefore paradoxical that
the Court would imply that the individual right to keep and bear arms is
fundamental and yet not grant this fundamental right strict-scrutiny
protection as it has with free speech and the free exercise of religion.189
Why does the majority reject applying the strict-scrutiny standard to
the Second Amendment and allow certain laws that limit the reach of the
right to keep and bear arms to be considered “presumptively”
constitutional or lawful? The answer is relatively clear: for the sake of
public safety and general well being.190 But how far does this public
safety interest extend? After all, the District of Columbia enacted the
gun-control legislation at issue in Heller for the sake of public safety.191
The answer to the question of how far the public safety interest should
extend may be found in Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach to
evaluating the constitutionality of gun-control regulations outlined
below.
C. Evaluating Gun-Control Regulations under Justice Breyer’s InterestBalancing Approach
Instead of adopting the rational-basis or strict-scrutiny standards,
Justice Breyer adopted “an interest-balancing inquiry” for the
constitutional evaluation of gun-control regulations under the individualright theory of the Second Amendment.192 Justice Breyer’s interestbalancing inquiry would weigh “the interests protected by the Second
Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety concerns on
the other . . . .”193 According to Justice Breyer, this interest-balancing
approach strikes a balance between rational-basis review and strict188. In its historical support for an individual-right reading of the Second Amendment, Justice
Scalia stated, “By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had become fundamental to
English subjects.” Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2798 (emphasis added). The Court also points out that
Blackstone “cited the arms provision of the Bill of Rights as one of the fundamental rights of
Englishmen.” Id. (citing 1 BLACKSTONE 136, 139–40 (1765) (emphasis added)).
189. However, Adam Winkler argues that “courts do not and have never applied strict scrutiny
consisten.tly to all” fundamental or enumerated rights found in the Constitution. Winkler, supra note
4, at 694.
190. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
191. Id. at 2854–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 2852 (Justice Breyer did not agree with the majority’s endorsement of the
individual-right reading of the Second Amendment, but according to Justice Breyer, this interestbalancing approach should be applied to gun-control regulations under the majority’s individualright reading as well).
193. Id.
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scrutiny review.194 Justice Breyer justified this interest-balancing
approach accordingly: “The fact that important interests lie on both sides
of the constitutional equation suggests that review of gun-control
regulation is not a context in which a court should effectively presume
either constitutionality (as in rational-basis review) or unconstitutionality
(as in strict scrutiny).”195
Justice Breyer further explained that “where a law significantly
implicates competing constitutionally protected interests in complex
ways,” courts should ask “whether the statute burdens a protected
interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s
salutary effects upon other important governmental interests.”196 In other
words, courts must determine at what point a statute that is enacted to
protect the public becomes unconstitutional because it impinges too
significantly on a protected, enumerated right. This interest-balancing
approach would allow judges to examine the statute’s effects upon the
competing interests and also allow judges to determine if “any clearly
superior less restrictive alternative” exists.197 When courts apply this
interest-balancing standard, some degree of deference is given to a
legislature’s judgment in matters where a legislature has greater expertise
and institutional fact-finding.198 However, “a court, not a legislature,
must make the ultimate constitutional conclusion, exercising its
‘independent judicial judgment’ in light of the whole record to determine
whether a law exceeds constitutional boundaries.”199
In criticizing this interest-balancing or “proportionality” approach,
the majority of Heller states, “We know of no other enumerated
constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a
freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”200 The majority saw Justice
Breyer’s “judge-empowering” standard as inappropriate because “The
very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of the government—
even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a caseby-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.”201 How
can this be true? How would courts apply any standard to existing or
future gun-control laws if they were not allowed to weigh the
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
197. Id.
198. See id. (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195–96 (1997)).
199. Id. (quoting Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 249 (2006)).
200. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821 (Scalia, J., majority).
201. Id. The majority also states, “A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’
assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.” Id.
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government’s interest in public safety against an individual’s right to
keep and bear arms? In accepting certain limitations on the right to bear
arms,202 isn’t the Court weighing interests and determining that the right
to bear arms “is [not] really worth insisting upon” in those limited
circumstances? The majority did not give this interest-balancing standard
as careful and honest an evaluation as it should have. Justice Breyer
responded to the majority’s criticisms of the interest-balancing standard
in stating, “Contrary to the majority’s unsupported suggestion that this
sort of ‘proportionality’ approach is unprecedented, the Court has applied
it in various constitutional contexts, including election law, speech cases,
and due process cases.”203
This interest-balancing standard is the correct standard for reviewing
gun-control regulations and should have been adopted by Justice Scalia
and the majority in Heller. As explained by Justice Breyer,204 this
approach strikes an important balance between the deference granting
rational-basis standard and the far less deferential strict-scrutiny
standard. In every challenge to gun-control regulations, two important
interests will strongly compete against each other: the government’s
interest in protecting the public from the improper or accidental uses of
guns versus the individual American’s interest in preserving her right to
keep and bear arms. Given these two competing and incredibly important
interests, it would be improper for a court to begin its analysis with a
presumption of either constitutionality or unconstitutionality.
Justice Breyer states that this interest-balancing approach is the
“preferable” standard “for a further reason.”205 Justice Breyer further
states, “Experience as much as logic has led the Court to decide that in
one area of constitutional law or another, the interests are likely to prove
stronger on one side of a typical constitutional case than on the other.”206
Since the Court has little experience in evaluating the Second
Amendment under the individual-right interpretation of the Second
Amendment, the interest-balancing standard would give courts the
opportunity to weigh the interests without the built-in bias for or against
the regulation that exists from the beginning of the evaluation in either
the rational-basis or strict-scrutiny contexts.207 Therefore, the Court in
202. See supra text accompanying note 185.
203. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Thompson v. W. State Med.
Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 388 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433
(1992); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339–49 (1976); Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High
Sch., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
204. See supra text accompanying note 195.
205. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 2852–53.
207. Id. at 2853.
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Heller should have adopted Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing standard
to give courts the direction and leeway to properly evaluate existing and
future gun-control regulations.
D. How Should Courts Evaluate Gun-Control Regulations post-Heller?
In rejecting not only the interest-balancing approach of Justice
Breyer, but also the rational-basis and (implicitly) the strict-scrutiny
approaches, the majority in Heller has seemingly painted the Court into a
standard-less corner. Justice Scalia and the majority merely stated that
the District of Columbia gun-control regulations were unconstitutional
“[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to
enumerated constitutional rights.”208 What standard should courts use to
evaluate future constitutional questions regarding gun-control
regulations? The answer is unfortunately far from clear. The Court in the
Heller opinion has explicitly prohibited courts from using both the
rational-basis standard and Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing
standard.209 The Court, in regarding certain existing gun-control
regulations as “presumptively lawful,” implicitly prohibited courts from
using the strict-scrutiny standard to review gun-control regulations.210
Given the Court’s reasoning, what standard is left?
The intermediate-scrutiny approach is the only standard not rejected
by the Court, making this standard possible in an “addition by
subtraction” process. To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statute or
classification must be “substantially related to an important government
objective.”211 In comparison to this intermediate standard, rational-basis
review requires a statute to bear a “rational relationship to a legitimate
government interest,”212 and strict scrutiny requires a statute to be
“narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.”213 This
intermediate standard would be very similar to Justice Breyer’s “interestbalancing” approach because a court evaluating a statute under this
intermediate approach would not begin with as strong a presumption for
or against the statute as would exist with rational basis or strict
scrutiny.214 Since the Court rejected the interest-balancing standard
208. Id. at 2817 (Scalia, J., majority); see also id. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 2817, 2821 (Scalia, J., majority).
210. See supra text accompanying note 186.
211. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (stating that this intermediate approach
“generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy”).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 160–64.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 173–79.
214. Adam Winkler states that an intermediate scrutiny standard “would likely lead to only
marginally different results than either strict scrutiny or even the reasonable regulation [or rational-
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suggested by Justice Breyer, the Court may also be unsatisfied with this
similar, intermediate approach. Also, given that the District of Columbia
could have very likely shown that the gun-control regulations at issue in
Heller were substantially related to the “important governmental
interest” of public safety,215 it is difficult to see how the Court could have
declared the D.C. gun-control regulations as unconstitutional under the
intermediate-scrutiny standard. Therefore, given the strong similarity of
the intermediate standard to Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing standard,
the Supreme Court would also likely reject this intermediate standard in
reviewing gun-control regulations.
Given the explicit or implicit rejection of potentially every standard
of constitutional review by Justice Scalia and the majority in Heller,
courts are left guessing about how to review existing and future guncontrol regulations under an individual-right reading of the Second
Amendment. The Court made waves by expressly adopting the
individual-right interpretation of the Second Amendment, seemingly
ending a long and drawn-out constitutional debate. However, the Court
likely created not only a new debate, but a cloud of mystery, in failing to
adopt a standard for future review of gun-control regulations.
V. CONCLUSION
Competing interests are common to the law, and the competition
between the government’s interest in public safety versus its interest in
the protection of enumerated rights is often seen in constitutional law. In
District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second
Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms, putting
to rest a long debate concerning the proper interpretation of the Second
Amendment. However, in refusing to adopt a specific standard for courts
to review existing and future gun-control regulations, and in possibly
rejecting all standards commonly used to review statutes for
constitutionality, the Court has likely planted the seeds for another long
debate surrounding the Second Amendment. The Court should have
adopted Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing standard of review for future
gun-control regulations. Unfortunately, the only thing made clear by the
majority opinion in Heller regarding the future review of gun-control
regulations is that the situation remains extremely unclear.
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